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Abstract. A channel is a logical space where agents make announcements pub-
licly. Examples of such objects are forums, wikis and social networks. Several ques-
tions arise about the nature of such a statement as well as about the attitude of the
agent herself in doing these announcements. Does the agent know whether the state-
ment is true? Is this agent announcing that statement or its opposite in any other
channel?
Extensions to Dynamic Epistemic Logics have been proposed in the recent past
that give account to public announcements. One major limit of these logics is that
announcements are always considered truthful. It is however clear that, in real life,
incompetent agents may announce false things, while deceitful agents may even an-
nounce things they do not believe in.
In this thesis, we provide a logical framework, called Multiple Channel Logic
(MCL), able to relate true statements, agent beliefs, and announcements on com-
munication channels. We discuss syntax and semantics of this logic and show the
behavior of the proposed deduction system. We then propose a topological catego-
rization of agents that makes use of the MCL framework. We introduce a complete
formalization of prejudices on agents’ attitudes and propose an extension of the rules
of the MCL framework. We then use RCC5 (the Region Connection Calculus) to cat-
egorize different agents in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) based on the collaboration,
competence, and honesty of agents. We discuss the possibility of using RCC3 and
RCC8 and generalize our results to define an upper bound on the number of different
types of agents in MAS. Finally, we extend the categorization to systems of commu-
nicating agents and we provide a tool to support the reasoning on systems defined
in MCL. We apply our topological categorization and tool to a specific MAS that
describes a Cyber-Physical System, for which we define, categorize, and discuss the
resulting attack states.
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Part I
Thesis overview

1Introduction
In several recent approaches to reasoning about web processes, two different matters
tend to intersect: the attitudes of the agents using the web for communication activ-
ities, and the beliefs of those agents. Consider, in particular, a situation in which a
set of agents use many different communication channels, such as blogs, social net-
works, forums. It may happen that these agents use those channels in an incoherent
way: for instance one agent may announce one statement in a channel while omit-
ting it in another one, or he can announce a statement in a channel and the opposite
statement in another one.
In multiple agent settings, there are two different forms of incoherence. We can
look at different agents announcing opposite statements, or to one agent announc-
ing opposite things. Both types of incoherence lie on the same ground: contradic-
tory statements are made. The former type involves different agents making such
statements (possibly on the same channel), while the latter type sees one single
agent making contradictory announcements (possibly on distinct channels, for cer-
tain cases).
In the first part of this thesis, we look at incoherences generated by announce-
ments made by one single agent, within a multiple agent logical framework. We then
investigate the set of possible communication attitudes of the agents. A communi-
cation attitude is the relation between reality facts and agent beliefs, or the relation
between beliefs and announcements the agent makes. It is rather common that agents
communicating on channels result not always competent on the matter they are talk-
ing about. Some agents can also be insincere, or they can hide some (possibly pri-
vate) information. The attitudes agents assume when communicating, or the ability
to know true facts about the reality are important aspects of the communication pro-
cesses. When we observe agents communicating, we typically have prejudices about
their attitudes, where prejudices value an agent behavior before observing what he
announces.
From this investigation we define a framework to reason on communicating
agents. We then apply the framework for the classification of communicating agents.
In particular, we apply our framework for reasoning about security configurations of
a MAS (Multi Agent System). In fact, reasoning about about properties of an agent
(e.g., about his honesty) is particularly relevant for the security research community,
where dishonest agents are used to formalize attacks to the systems under considera-
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tion. As a result, a number of research thesis have focused their attention to spotting
unintended or even malicious behavior in MAS. We specifically focus on Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) as examples of such problems as reported widely in [15, 24]
and in [16], where an agent-based model of CPS is considered. In order to reason
and classify CPS (as systems of communicating agents in MCL) we provide a tool
called ABF Tool.
Distinguishing between the different types of agents in a MAS is a difficult task.
This is witnessed by the fact that although a characterization of agents would obvi-
ously play a crucial role in the understanding of different aspects and facets in MAS,
a proper definition is still missing.
2About this thesis
The aim of this chapter is to list all the collaborations, projects and scientific articles
related to this thesis and to give a roadmap for the thesis, highlighting the main
contents of each chapter.
2.1 Collaborations and publications related to this thesis
My PhD has been supported by the University of Verona. In particular, during the
PhD I spent twelve months in Singapore (from September 2015 to September 2016)
at the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) and six months in
Luxembourg (from the 28th of December 2017 to the 26th of May 2017) at the
University of Luxembourg.
List of publications related to this thesis:
1. Matteo Cristani, Elisa Burato, Katia Santaca`, Claudio Tomazzoli - “The Spider-
man Behavior Protocol: Exploring Both Public and Dark Social Networks for
Fake Identity Detection in Terrorism Informatics”. In the proceedings of the
International Workshop on Knowledge Discovery on the WEB (2015), pages
77–88. [8].
2. Matteo Cristani, Francesco Olivieri, Katia Santaca` - “A logical model of com-
munication channels”. In the proceedings of In Intelligent and Evolutionary Sys-
tems (2016), pages 57-71. [9]
3. Katia Santaca`, Matteo Cristani, Marco Rocchetto, Luca Vigano` - “A Topological
Categorization of Agents for the Definition of Attack States in Multi-Agent Sys-
tems”. In the proceedings of Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies
(2016), pages 261-276. [25]
2.2 Synopsis
Part II - Multiple Channel Logic.
• In Chapter 3, we look at incoherences generated by announcements made by
one single agent, within a multiple agent logical framework.
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• In Chapter 4, we present a logical formalism, the Multiple Channel Logic.
Part III - Assertion, Belief, and Fact - A Logical Framework for the Formal
Definition of Communicating Agents.
• In Chapter 5, we introduce the MCL application for the categorization of agents.
• In Chapter 6, we classify the possible behaviors of an agent defined in MCL.
• In Chapter 7, we describe the tool that we have applied to the identification of
all (or a selection of) the possible configurations of a system of agents in MCL.
Part IV - State of the Art
We give a general overview of state-of-the-art.
Part V - Conclusion and Future Work
We summarize the contents of the thesis and discuss some possible future directions.
Part II
Multiple Channel Logic

3Introduction
In this thesis, we investigate how to combine public announcements with beliefs that
are also not necessarily aligned with the reality. Somebody can have a false belief
or he can believe something that is not known as true or false. Moreover agents
can announce things they do not believe, or avoid to announce things they actually
believe.
To clarify what we mean with this research boundaries, we provide a general
example of announcements and their relations with truth and beliefs.
Example 3.1. Alice, Bob and Charlie travel quite often for work. They are also pas-
sionate about good food and love visiting nice restaurants. To choose the best hotels
and restaurants in town, they use as channels the social networks C1 and C2, where
they are also active users by posting reviews and feedbacks. During their last busi-
ness trip, they all stayed at the hotel H and they ate at the restaurants R1, R2 and
R3. Once back home, Bob posts a review on channel C1 announcing that hotel H
was dirty (saying dirty(H)), whilst on channel C2 he announces that H was clean
(saying ¬dirty(H)). Alice agrees with his announcement on C1 but does not post any
comments on C2, while Charlie announces ¬dirty(H) both on C1 and C2.
We assume that hotel H being clean or dirty is not a matter of opinions but a
provable fact. It follows that we may draw some conclusions on the statements an-
nounced by Alice, Bob and Charlie on C1 and C2. First, Bob is not truthful since he
announces dirty(H) on C1 and ¬dirty(H) on C2. It may be the case that he believes
in only one of the two announces (and possibly in none of them) and, consequently,
he is lying in one of the two channels.
In this thesis, we assume atemporal channels, namely announcements are made in
a channel and hold forever and eversince, with respect to the moment in which the
announcement is made. When an agent observes a particular channel and another
agent contradicts herself in that channel the observer finds it out. Consequently we
assume that agents make coherent announcements in every single channel, though it
is possible that they make opposite announcements in distinct channels. In temporal
channels, an agent might announce a statement, and, later, announce the opposite
statement. Provided that he is not lying, this implies a belief revision process he
passed through in order to change his point of view.
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In general, we include agents that can do more real-life things than just truth-
ful and sincere announcements. They can lie, but it is also possible that they just
announce things they simply are not informed about. An agent can make an an-
nouncement that corresponds to his belief, or he can claim the opposite of his belief.
Moreover he can behave in a combination of the three above basic attitudes on dif-
ferent channels. On the same way, an agent can believe things that are true, that are
false, and that are neither true or false.
We assume consistent agents, that is agents that either believe in the truthfulness
of a given statement, or believe in the truthfulness of the opposite statement; natu-
rally, we allow that an agent may be not competent on a certain topic and, as such,
believe in neither of them, but never to believe in both at the same.
Back to the example, while Bob and Charlie announce on every channel, Alice
decides to express his opinions just on channel C1. Finally, Alice and Charlie are
consistent with themselves even if not with one another. Therefore, they can be both
sincere but one of them is not competent. We shall assume that competent agents do
generally know any topic discussed in every channel, while – admittedly a strong
assumption – if the agent is ignorant in at least one topic, then he is considered
incompetent.
The structure of this part is as follows. In Section 4 we define the logical lan-
guage. In Chapter 4.2, we introduce the semantics of the logic and in Chapter 4.1
we provide a inference rules of the framework. Section 4.3 provides the prove of
soundness for the introduced logic. We conclude in Chapter V with a summary of
the results obtained in the investigation and a proposal of a few further investigations.
4Multiple Channel Logic
In this section, we present our logical formalism, the Multiple Channel Logic (here-
after MCL); MCL is specified in terms of language, semantics and inference rules.
MCL is a three-layered labelled, modal logical framework. The first layer of
MCL is a propositional calculus. The second layer is a multi-modal calculus, where
we can use three distinct modalities: one modality of belief, permitting to assert that
an agent believes in a proposition, one modality for stating that a given proposition
is asserted by an agent in every channel, and one modality to state that an agent
asserts a proposition in at least one channel. The last two are henceforth named
communication modalities.
The second layer does not allow skolemization, permitting, in particular, only to
assert that when an agent believes in a proposition, he cannot believe in the oppo-
site, and that he cannot simultaneously believe in something and not believe in it.
The same holds for the communication modalities, combined in a dual fashion. A
proposition can not be asserted by an agent in every channel when its opposite is
asserted in one channel, and, on the other hand, we cannot assert a proposition in
every channel and not asserting it in one channel (and vice versa). Not asserting any-
where a proposition does not imply that the opposite of this proposition is asserted
somewhere (and vice versa). When we deal with the deduction rules, in section 4.1,
we shall mark those rules that guarantee this forms of duality.
Within the third layer, we habilitate agent tagging with the explicit purpose of
allowing assertion of prejudices about agent communicative attitudes. In particular,
we tag an agent as sincere, collaborative, and other positive or negative tags. The
statement of an agent tag associated to a given agent is named a prejudice. Prejudices
are employed as means to make certain deduction rules apply.
An MCL theoryT is a tripleT = 〈W,A,R〉, whereW is the logical language,A
is the set of axioms, and R is the set of inference rules, in our specific case, rewriting
rules. When the set A is empty, then we call T a calculus. For a given MCL theory
M we denote by RM the set of axiom of M. To represent the set of rules R, that is
common to any MCL theory, we also use, for symmetry withAM the notation RM .
We employ the alphabet
∑
=L∪C∪M∪S∪Λ∪T where:
L is a finite non-empty set of propositional letters L ={A1,A2, . . . ,An},
C is the set of connectives C ={¬,∧,∨ ∼,−, },
M is the set of modalitiesM ={B,T2,T3},
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S is the set of logical signs S ={(, ), [, ],⊥},
Λ is a finite non-empty set of agents labels Λ =
{
λ1, . . . ,λm
}
,
T is the set of agent tags T = {Co,S ,S Cl,WCl,O}.
A propositional formula ϕ is defined by ϕ := A | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ ϕ | ϕ∨ ϕ where A de-
notes a letter. The second layer of MCL is a modal logic where the modal operators
are B for beliefs, while T2 and T3 are the operators for the communication chan-
nels. We use T2 (T3) to denote that an agent tells the embedded formula in every (at
least one) communication channel. A modal formula is µ ::= B[λ : ϕ] | T2[λ : ϕ] |
T3[λ : ϕ] | ∼µ where ϕ denotes a propositional formula. The modal formula for
belief B[λ : ϕ] is intended to denote that the agent λ believes ϕ. For the purpose of
this thesis, the intended notion of belief embeds the notion of knowledge as meant in
Epistemic Logic.
The modal formula T2[λ : ϕ] denotes that the agent λ announces ϕ everywhere,
namely, when λ announces ϕ in a channel C, then he announces ϕ in any channel C′
that is accessible from C. When we provide the semantics of MCL we shall relate
the notion of accessibility to the notion of observation. A channel C′ is accessible
from a channel C when the observer of C, also observes C′.
On the third layer of the logical framework we make use of the agent tags. An
agent tag formula has one of the two formats α :: = +(X)λ | −(X)λ where X ∈
{Co,S ,S Cl,WCl,O} is an agent tag, and λ is the label representing the agent. The
intended meaning of the tags is competent for Co, sincere for S , strongly (weakly)
collaborative for S Cl and WCl, respectively and omniscient for O.
4.1 A deduction system for MCL
In this Section we provide a set of inference rules for MCL. These rules are redun-
dant. In the stream of rules below, we prove that some of the rules can be reduced.
The rules can be of three distinct types:
• Introduction rules use the elements appearing in the antecedent for building
those elements that appear in the subsequent;
• Elimination rules de-construct elements appearing in the antecedent into ele-
ments in the subsequent;
• ⊥ rules introduce a contradiction, deriving ⊥ in the subsequent.
The first group of rules, defined below, manage inference on the propositional layer
of MCL. We adapted the classical presentation of Prawitz [21] for propositional cal-
culus to our needs. We shall then introduce a few other specific ⊥ rules while pro-
viding the single contexts for the inference rules of the propositional layer, for the
belief layer and finally for the announcement layer.
Without loss of generality we assume that axioms in a MCL theory M are all
written in Conjunctive Normal Form, namely as conjunctions of disjunctions of pos-
itive and negative literals.
Below, Introduction is shortened to In., Elimination to El., D.N. for Double Nega-
tion, Left is shortened to L and Right to R, and finally Non Contradiction to N.C. The
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“Ex falso sequitur quodlibet in beliefs” rule is shortened to EFSQ, and Modus Po-
nens is shortened to MP
ϕ ψ
R.1
ϕ∧ψ [In. ∧]
ϕ∧ψ
R.2 ϕ [R el. ∧]
ϕ∧ψ
R.3
ψ
[L el. ∧] ϕR.4
ϕ∨ψ [In. ∨]
ϕ∨ψ
R.5
ψ
[R el. of ∨] ϕ∨ψR.6 ϕ [L el. of ∨]
ϕ
R.7 ¬¬ϕ [In. of D.N.]
¬¬ϕ
R.8 ϕ [El. of D.N.]
ϕ ¬ϕ
RC.1 ⊥ [N.C. principle]
⊥RC.2 ϕ [EFSQ]
The last operation we need in this group to provide for inferential mechanism is the
Modus Ponens rule, that we introduce as follows:
ϕ
(
¬ϕ∨ψ
)
MP.1
ψ
[Propositional modus ponens]
The second group of rules manage inference on the layer of beliefs. The last rule
manages the behavior of combined negations ∼ and ¬. This is a quasi-skolemization,
in the sense that it introduces the concept that someone cannot believe that a fact is
true and simultaneously not believe that the negation of that fact is false.
B[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ψ]
R.9 B[λ : ϕ∧ψ] [In. ∧ in B ]
B[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.10 B[λ : ϕ]
[R el. ∧ in B ]
B[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.11 B[λ : ψ]
[L el. ∧ in B ] B[λ : ϕ]R.12 B[λ : ϕ∨ψ] [In. ∨ in B ]
B[λ : ϕ]
R.13 B[λ : ¬¬ϕ] [In. of D.N. in B ]
B[λ : ¬¬ϕ]
R.14 B[λ : ϕ]
[El. of D.N. in B ]
B[λ : ϕ]
R.15 ∼ B[λ : ¬ϕ] [Coherence of disbeliefs]
We provide the ⊥ rules for the belief layer. The first rule is used for belief of contra-
diction, while the second rule is used for belief contradiction. A belief contradiction
occurs when the claim of belief is contradicted by the claim of corresponding dis-
belief. We also have a belief contradiction rule corresponding to “Ex falso sequitur
quodlibet in beliefs”. We then introduce the Modus Ponens rule for beliefs.
B[λ : ϕ] B[λ : (¬ϕ)]
RC.3 ⊥ [B of contr.]
B[λ : ⊥]
RC.4 B[λ : ϕ]
[B EFSQ]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
RC.5 ⊥ [B contr.]
B[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ¬ϕ∨ψ]
MP.2
ψ
[B MP]
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We obtain the ⊥ when we believe in ϕ and either we believe in the opposite, or we
do not believe in it.
The third group of rules is introduced to manage inference on T2 and T3 modal-
ities. The first subgroup, formed by the rules R.12–R.16, supplies the five classical
rules for introduction, left and right elimination for ∧, introduction and elimination
for double negation for T2. The rules R.28 and R.28 represent, respectively, Coher-
ence of missing announcements (COM) and Coherence of provided announcements
(COP), and correspond to the quasi-skolemization of the modalities T2 and T3. Se-
riality is shortened below to Ser.
T2[λ : ϕ] T2[λ : ψ]
R.16 T2[λ : ϕ∧ψ] [In. ∧ on T2]
T2[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.17 T2[λ : ϕ] [R el. ∧ on T2]
T2[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.18 T2[λ : ψ] [L el. ∧ on T2]
T2[λ : ϕ]
R.19 T2[λ : ϕ∨ψ] [In. ∨ in T2]
T2ϕ
R.20 T2[λ : ¬¬ϕ] [In. of D.N. on T2]
T2[λ : ¬¬ϕ]
R.21 T2[λ : ϕ] [El. of D.N. on T2]
T3[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.22 T3[λ : ϕ] [R el. ∧ on T3]
T3[λ : ϕ∧ψ]
R.23 T3[λ : ψ] [L el. ∧ on T3]
T3[λ : ϕ]
R.24 T3[λ : ϕ∨ψ] [In. ∨ in T3]
T3ϕ
R.25 T3[λ : ¬¬ϕ] [In. of D.N. on T3]
T3[λ : ¬¬ϕ]
R.26 T3[λ : ϕ] [El. of D.N. on T3]
T2[λ : ϕ]
R.27 T3[λ : ϕ] [Ser. T2 on T3]
T2[λ : ϕ]
R.28 ∼ T3[λ : ¬ϕ] [COM]
T3[λ : ϕ]
R.29 ∼ T2[λ : ¬ϕ] [COP]
If agent λ announces ϕ on every channel, it is straightforward that he announces it on
at least one channel (R.27). If λ announces ϕ on every channel, then in no channel he
may announces the opposite (R.28). Lastly, if λ announces ϕ on at least one channel,
then he cannot announce the opposite on every channel (R.29).
We now present the ⊥ rules for announcements. Announcement contradictions
are shortened below to AC.
T3[λ : (ϕ∧¬ϕ)]
RC.6 ⊥ [AC on T2]
T2[λ : (ϕ∧¬ϕ)]
RC.7 ⊥ [AC]
T2[λ : ϕ] T3[λ : ¬ϕ]
RC.8 ⊥ [AC on T3]
RC.8 is derived from R.28–R.29: announcing ϕ on every channel contradicts with
announcing ¬ϕ somewhere. Again we provide a modus ponens rule for T2 and T3.
The first is Channel existential Modus Ponens (CEMP), the second is Channel Uni-
versal Modus Ponens (CUMP).
T2[λ : ϕ] T3[¬ϕ∨ψ]
MP.3 T3 : [λ : ψ] [CEMP]
T3[λ : ϕ] T2[¬ϕ∨ψ]
MP.4 T3 : [λ : ψ] [CUMP]
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We need to manage introduction and elimination of missing beliefs and missing an-
nounces. We summarize the above by using the expression µ to denote a modal for-
mula of MCL.
µ[λ : ϕ]
R.30 ∼∼ µ[λ : ϕ] [In. of double ∼]
∼∼ µ[λ : ϕ]
R.31
µ[λ : ϕ]
[El. of double ∼]
We can introduce the rules for the agent tags. We have two rules that relate reality and
beliefs, based on the expressed prejudice of omniscience and competence. Moreover,
we have two pairs of rules for weak and strong collaboration tags, and one rule for
sincereness which relates beliefs and communication channels.
All the above mentioned rules are employed for positive tags. For every positive
tag, we have the dual rule for the negative counterpart.
ϕ +(O)λ
R.32 B[λ : ϕ]
[Ext. +(O)] B[λ : ϕ] +(Co)λR.33 ϕ [Ext. +(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] +(Wcl)λ
R.34 T3[λ : ϕ] [Ext. +(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] +(S Cl)λ
R.35 T2[λ : ϕ] [Ext. +(S Cl)]
T3[λ : ϕ] +(S )λ
R.36 B[λ : ϕ]
[Ext. +(S )]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ϕ
R.37 -(O)λ
[In. -(O)]
B[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.38 -(Co)λ
[In. -(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 -(Wcl)λ
[In. -(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.40 -(S cl)λ
[In. -(S Cl)]
T3[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.41 -(S )λ
[In. -(S )]
An agent is omniscient if he knows every true formula. An agent is competent is
every formula he knows is true. Notice that in the case of omniscience, the set of
formulae believed true by the agent is a superset of the (actually) true formulae: the
agent knows all what is true but he may also believe in some formulae proven neither
true, nor false. On the contrary, in case of competence, the agent’s beliefs are a subset
of the true formulae; as such, all the agent’s beliefs are proven to be true but there
may be true formulae “out” of his knowledge base.
If an agent believes that ϕ is true and he is weakly collaborative, then he will
announces ϕ in at least one channel. Sincerity relates the communication of an agent
with his beliefs. As such, a sincere agent that tells ϕ on a channel, then he believes ϕ
to be true. We might be tempted to formulate sincerity from “the other agents’ per-
spective” and state that occurs whenever an agent announces ϕ somewhere while ¬ϕ
anywhere. The proposed formulation of R.36 has the advantage that a sincere agent
cannot contradict herself. This would lead to a contradiction due to λ being sincere
and the application of R.36 to both T3[λ : ϕ] and T3[λ : ϕ], and the subsequent
application of RC.3.
Sincerity and collaboration do not derive one another. Assume three channels
and that agent λ believes both formulae ϕ and ψ to be true. Suppose that λ announces
ϕ on the first channel, ¬ϕ on the second one, and ψ on the third one. In this setting,
λ is collaborative but not sincere. Suppose now that λ solely announces ψ on the
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first channel. In this case, λ is sincere but not collaborative. It is straightforward
to notice that R.35 subsumes R.34 through seriality. In addition, it implies a subtle
form of sincerity. A strongly collaborative agent cannot announce anything he does
believe to be true, even if he might announce something he believes to be neither true
nor false. (Indeed, whenever the strongly collaborative λ has ∼Bϕ as well as ∼B¬ϕ,
nothing prevent his to announce either ϕ or ¬ϕ somewhere.)
Trivially, an agent: (R.37) is non-omniscient whenever he does not believe true an
actually true formula, (R.38) is incompetent whenever he believe true a false formula.
An agent is not weakly (strongly) collaborative if he knows something which he does
not announce in at least one channel. Finally, an insincere agent announces, in at least
one channel, a formula he does not believe to be true. In our formulation, it is not
necessary that the agent believes in the truthfulness of a formula ϕ while announcing
¬ϕ to be considered insincere.
R.38 depends on R.37. In fact, given the premises of R.37, by applying R.15 to
B[λ : ϕ] we obtain ∼B[λ : ¬ϕ].
Finally we introduce the rules that provide contradictions between prejudices
(positive and negative). The set of rules can be summarized by the expressions +(P)λ
as the assertion of the prejudice P on λ, and −(P)λ as the negation of the prejudice P
on λ.
+(P)λ − (P)λ
RC.9 ⊥ [Prejudice contradiction]
4.2 The semantics of MCL
In MCL, the announcement of a formula by one agent cannot be bound to appear
on a single, specific channel. We can only bind an announcement to appear in either
all channels, or at least one. We therefore employ a semantics for the modalities that
follows Kripke’s modeling guidelines.
In order to build the semantics of a MCL theory we provide the interpretation of
the signature, of first-layer formulae, of second-layer formulae and of agent tags. Ac-
cordingly, the semantics of a MCL theory is a tupleM=〈WC,WA,WR,WL,RC,I〉.
where WC is the domain of Channels, WA is the domain of Agents, WR is the
Boolean twofold interpretation domain {true, f alse}, WL is the the domain of the
Letters, a finite non-empty set, as numerous as the letters in the signature of MCL,
RC is the accessibility relation between elements of WC, I is the Interpretation
function.
Given a MCL theory L, the interpretation function maps every propositional letter
of the signature of L in one element of WR, every agent letter in one element of
WA, every channel letter in one element of WC, and finally every agent tag in a
subset ofWA. The accessibility relation is defined inWC. The accessibility relation
captures the idea that a channel C1 is related to a channel C2 iff the external observer
representing the theory can observe C2 whenever he observes C1. The accessibility
relation is assumed therefore to be reflexive and transitive, while we do not make any
assumption about symmetry.
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The interpretation of ⊥ is I(⊥) = f alse. The truth of a propositional formula
follows the classic interpretation of ∧, ∨ and ¬ operators.
Interpretations are models when they provide consistent evaluations for the
propositional layer, the beliefs, the announcements and the relationships between
the above determined by the expression of prejudices.
In particular, we assume that for a model the following hold:
1. The interpretation of the set of propositional axioms is consistent with the inter-
pretation of letters;
2. The interpretation of each agent belief set is a consistent propositional theory
with respect to the interpretation of pairs formed by agent and propositional
letters;
3. The set of announcements for each agent in every single channel is a consistent
propositional theory with respect to the interpretation of triples formed by agent,
channel and propositional letters;
4. For every modal formula T2[λ : ϕ] asserted axiomatically in L and for every
channel C in which ϕ is announced by λ, ϕ is announced by λ in every channel
related from C by the accessibility relation;
5. For every modal formula T3[λ : ϕ] asserted axiomatically in L and for every
channel C in which ϕ is announced by λ, ϕ is announced by λ in at least one
channel related from C by the accessibility relation;
6. For every omniscient agent λ and every formula ϕ that is interpreted true, then ϕ
is also a belief of λ;
7. For every competent agent λ and every formula ϕ believed by λ, then ϕ is inter-
preted true;
8. For every sincere agent λ, if a formula ϕ is announced in one channel by λ, then
ϕ is a belief of λ;
9. For every strongly collaborative agent λ, and every belief ϕ of λ, λ announces ϕ
in every channel;
10. For every weakly collaborative agent λ, and every belief ϕ of λ, λ announces ϕ
in at least one channel.
As usual, when a MCL theory L has a model, then L is called satisfiable. Con-
versely, when it has no model is called unsatisfiable. A set of axioms containing the
symbol ⊥ is unsatisfiable.
When we value semantics as defined above, we name such a model a MCL-
model, and we say that this holds for a MCL-semantics.
To explain how the interpretation of a theory works we introduce here an exam-
ple.
Example 4.1. Consider three agents. The construction of the model is performed as
follows: starting from a set of axioms A1,A2, . . .An, corresponding to the interpreta-
tion of the letters AI1 . . .A
I
n .
An interpretation is, in fact, a set of literals assumed true: A1,A3,A5,A6.
An assignments for the beliefs of the agents is something like:
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λ1 A1,A3,A6
λ2 A1,A6
λ3 A2
and we can define for each C, where C is a channel, an assignment as in the scheme
below.
λ1,C1 A1,A2 λ2,C1 . . . λ3,C1 . . . λN,C1 . . .
λ1,C2 A1,A2 λ2,C2 . . . λ3,C2 . . . λN,C1 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
λ1,Cm A1,A2 λ2,Cm . . . λ3,Cm . . . λN,CM
...
On the other hand, a channel is a space for interpreting announcements of the agents.
The underlying idea, again, is that a single agent in a single channel announces things
in a coherent way, being irrational that an agent contradicts herself in a completely
observable channel. Thus, the set of axioms corresponding to agent assertion quan-
tifications are mapped to channels by choosing a set of literals for each agent label
that, assumed true, makes coherent the statements of the agent mapped in that par-
ticular channel.
4.3 Formal properties of MCL
In this section we prove that MCL is sound and complete with respect to the intro-
duced semantics. For the sake of space, the proofs of simplest results are omitted,
and we only deal with the main ones.
The task we look at is consistency checking. Given a MCL theory L, we aim at
establishing whether the set of axioms in L are consistent with each other, or, in other
terms, whether they can or cannot derive a contradiction.
The first property we prove is that the set of deduction rules introduced for MCL
theories preserve satisfiability. When employing the deduction rules of MCL we
transform a theory L into other theories, called derived from L. We specifically say
that a theory L is deductively closed when applying the deduction rules to L we ob-
tain L. Conversely, when applying rules to a theory L leads to a theory L′, and further
on, to a theory L∗, that is deductively closed, we name L∗ the deductive closure of L.
Lemma 4.2. Given a satisfiable MCL theory L, if L′ is derived from L, then L′ is
satisfiable.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the rules R.1-R.40 and of the rules MP.1-
MP.4, along with the definition of MCL-models.
Lemma 4.3. Given an unsatisfiable MCL theory L, if L′ is derived from L, then L′ is
unsatisfiable.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2 and of rules RC.1-RC.9,
along with the definition of MCL-models..
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An immediate, straightforward consequence of the above mentioned lemmas is
claimed in Corollary 4.4, whose proof is omitted.
Corollary 4.4. The deductive closure L∗ of a MCL theory L is consistent iff L is
consistent.
Based on Lemma 4.2, 4.3 and Corollary 4.4, we can conclude Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.5. The rules of MCL preserve satisfiability.
Once we have proved that the rules preserve satisfiability, we are now able to claim a
soundness result. The soundness result is obtained by means of the rules, the standard
interpretation of ⊥ and the notion of MCL-model.
First of all, we claim that when a theory is contradictory, its deductive closure
contains ⊥. Secondly, we prove the inverse: if a MCL theory L′ contains ⊥, when
another theory L can be transformed by the rules onto L′, then L contains either ⊥
or a contradiction. When, given a theory L′, there is not a theory L such that L′ is
derived from L, we say that L′ is primary.
Lemma 4.6. The deductive closure of a contradictory theory contains ⊥.
Lemma 4.7. Every theory L′ containing ⊥ that is not primary, can be derived from
a different theory L that either contains ⊥ or is contradictory.
As a consequence of the above lemmas we conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8. The deduction system of MCL is sound.
In order to prove the completeness of the MCL deduction rules with respect to the
semantics introduced in Section 4.2 we firstly show the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. If a MCL theory L is satisfiable, then it is consistent.
Proof. Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 prove that deductively closed satisfiable theories do not
contain ⊥. As a consequence, if a theory had a model, then it would be consistent.
Based on Lemma 4.9 we can finally prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. The deduction system of MCL is complete.

Part III
Assertion, Belief, and Fact - A Logical Framework for
the Formal Definition of Communicating Agents

5Introduction
Much effort has been devoted to the characterization of different agents in Multi-
Agent Systems (MAS), ranging from works that employ Dynamic Epistemic Logic
and Public Announcement Logics (PAL) [30] to more recent approaches such as [1].
These works have studied an agent’s beliefs and announcements, typically under the
assumption that agents are always truthful and sincere. However, as discussed in,
e.g., [9], this assumption is an oversimplification since most MAS contain a number
of agents that are clearly neither sincere nor truthful.
General problems with agency and norms, namely social regulations, are pre-
sented in [12], where many open problems are discussed. Further investigations, in-
cluding those in Public Announcement Logic [1], have devised a pathway to follow,
with many problems in the definitions still open. A step in this direction has been car-
ried out in [9], which introduced a general logical framework called Multiple Chan-
nel Logic Framework (MCL). However, the focus of [9] is on the definition of the
framework and little attention is payed to the definition of a general categorization
of all the possible agents that could be defined using MCL.
The overall goal of this part of the thesis is the definition of a general categoriza-
tion of agents, based on MCL. We focus, in particular, on the application of MAS for
reasoning about security systems, such as CPS. More specifically, our contributions
are:
1. We define a topological categorization of agents in MAS, obtaining 50 new rules
in the MCL framework.
2. We identify a theoretical limit to the maximum number of different types of
agents in a MAS (defined using MCL).
3. We extend our results to systems of communicating agents defined in MCL by
defining and characterize channels.
4. We implement a tool to reason on systems of agents defined in MCL.
5. As an example of a concrete application, we apply our topological categorization
to define attack states for a MAS that describes a general CPS. Our case study
ultimately allows us to show that our categorization of agents can be used to
reason about the security of CPS and, more generally, MAS.

6Agents and Systems of Agents in MAS
In MCL, agents are defined by using the three main components of the framework:
the sets Aλ, Bλ and F of announcements, beliefs and facts. A natural step is to define
how many different types of agents can be defined out of these three sets. To do that,
we first extend the results of [9] by considering the relations between these three sets
and then use these relations to define agents in MCL.
Intuitively, we can define the following three relations:
• Collaboration (Aλ,Bλ) is the relation between beliefs and announcements of an
agent λ. This relation defines the level of collaboration of λ as the quantity of
data an agent announces with respect to the data he believes. For example, if an
agent asserts everything he believes, he is collaborative (recall that belief can be
false, in which case the agent might not be competent).
• Competence (Bλ,F) is the relation between beliefs of an agent λ and true facts.
This relation defines the level of competence of λ and is related to the quality of
data an agent produces. For example, if everything an agent believes is also true,
he is competent (note that this is not the definition of knowledge since an agent
could believe in false formulae).
• Honesty (Aλ,F) is the relation between announcements made by an agent λ and
true facts. This relation defines the level of honesty of λ. For example, if every-
thing an agent shares on a channel is also true, then he is honest.1
Given that these three relations are over sets, they express mereological relations.
We use the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) to reason on the different “levels” of
collaboration/competence/honesty and to identify which are the different possible
relations between the three sets Aλ, Bλ and F. This ultimately defines how many
different types of agents we can theoretically consider.
RCC, as defined in [13, 17], is an axiomatization of certain spatial concepts and
relations in first-order logic. In its broader definition, the RCC theory is composed by
eight axioms, and is known as RCC8, but here we restrict to RCC5 by not considering
tangential connections between spatial regions. We discuss the choice of RCC5 in
more detail in Section 6.2.
1 Note that honesty is not necessary related to correctness. In fact, we define an agent as
honest if he asserts the truth even if he does not believe in what he asserts.
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ϕ + (O)λ
R.32 B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(O)] B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λR.33 ϕ [E. +(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WCl)λR.34 T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (S Cl)λ
R.35 T2[λ : ϕ] [E. +(S Cl)]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (S )λ
R.36 B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(S )]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ϕ
R.37 −(O)λ [I. −(O)]
B[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.38 −(Co)λ [I. −(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 −(WCl)λ [I. −(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.40 −(S Cl)λ [I.−(S Cl)]
T3[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.41 −(S )λ [I.−(S )]
Fig. 6.1. The rules for prejudice in MCL
Table 6.1. RCC3, RCC5, and RCC8 relations between spatial regions X, Y and Z
R
C
C
3
R
C
C
5
R
C
C
8
Name Notation Definition
Connects with C(X,Y) X ⊆ Y
Disconnected from ¬C(X,Y) X * Y
Part of P(X,Y) ∀Z C(Z,X)→ C(Z,Y)
Overlaps O(X,Y) ∃Z P(Z,X)∧P(Z,Y) Overlaps Not Equal ONE(X,Y) O(X,Y)∧¬EQ(X,Y)   Equal to EQ(X,Y) P(X,Y)∧P(Y ,X)   DiscRete from DR(X,Y) ¬O(X,Y)  Partial-Overlap PO(X,Y) O(X,Y)∧¬P(X,Y)∧¬P(Y ,X) Proper-part-of PP(X,Y) P(X,Y)∧¬P(Y ,X) Proper-part-of-inverse PPi(X,Y) P(Y ,X)∧¬P(X,Y) Externally Connected EC(X,Y) C(X,Y)∧¬O(X,Y) Tangential PP TPP(X,Y) PP(X,Y)∧∃Z [EC(Z,X),EC(Z,Y)] Tangential PPi TPPi(X,Y) TPP(Y ,X) Non-tangential PP NTPP(X,Y) PP(X,Y)∧¬∃Z [EC(Z,X),EC(Z,Y)] Non-tangential PPi NTPPi(X,Y) NTPP(Y ,X)
We define parthood as the primitive binary inclusion relation ⊆, which is re-
flexive, antisymmetric and transitive. In Table 6.1, we define the relations of RCC3,
RCC5 and RCC8, where X, Y and Z are sets (spatial regions) of formulae and Con-
nects with expresses the parthood relation. By applying these relations to the pairs
(Aλ,Bλ), (Bλ,F) and (Aλ,F), we can distinguish between different levels of collab-
oration, competence and honesty. Every tuple representing the combination of the
three relations defines a different type of agent.
Agent = 〈RCC51(Aλ,Bλ), RCC52(Bλ,F), RCC53(Aλ,F)〉 ,
where RCC51, RCC52 and RCC53 are relations in RCC-5. As we discuss in Sec-
tion 6.2, some combinations of RCC51, RCC52 and RCC53 are topologically incor-
rect.
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6.1 Categorization of Agents
We now consider the details of every RCC5 relation between each pair of Aλ, Bλ and
F and we define 15 different prejudices. Our list is complete with respect to RCC5,
i.e., no other relations can be considered. We will use overline numbers to identify
the new rules we introduce, whereas the decimals for the rules were already defined
in [9].
6.1.1 Collaboration
Sincere PP(Aλ,Bλ). A sincere agent λ is defined by the proper part of his announce-
ments with respect to his beliefs. More formally, for any propositional formula ϕ,
if T∗[λ : ϕ] then B[λ : ϕ] ,
where ∗ identifies one of the two modalities in MCL, i.e., ∗ ∈ {2,3}.
This type of agent announces only what he believes (⇒) but does not announce
everything he believes (:). As already defined in [9], we can negate the formula of
a sincere agent and provide deduction rules to define when an agent is not sincere as
follows. For a non-sincere agent λ2, there exists a propositional formula ϕ such that
T∗[λ : ϕ] and ∼ B[λ : ϕ] .
We can then define rules that formalize that if an agent asserts, even only once,
something that he does not believe in, then he is non-sincere:
T3[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.41 −(WS )λ [I.−(WS )]
T2[λ : ϕ] ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.1 −(S S )λ [I.−(S S )]
As we discussed in Section 6, the notion of weak and strong is only applied to
the notion of collaborative agent in MCL. We avoid this asymmetry and we intro-
duce the notion of weak and strong for all the prejudices involving a relation with
announcements. This explains why we have now used WS in R.41 instead of S of
MCL (as in Fig. 6.1). We extend the elimination rules accordingly:
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WS )λ
R.2 ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WS )]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (S S )λ
R.3 ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S S )]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WS )λ
R.36 B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(WS )]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (S S )λ
R.4 B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(S S )]
Collaborative PPi(Aλ,Bλ). Symmetrically to a sincere agent, a collaborative agent
λ is defined by the proper part of his beliefs with respect to his announcements: for
any propositional formula ϕ,
if B[λ : ϕ] then T∗[λ : ϕ] .
This type of agent announces everything he believes (⇒) but what he says is not
only what he believes (:). Hence, some of the announcements are intentionally
2 Slightly abusing notation, we are using λ for both a sincere and non-sincere agent.
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against his beliefs (these announcements might be accidentally true facts but we will
discuss this case later in this section). If we negate the definition of collaborative,
we obtain that if an λ’s belief has not been announced (i.e., there exists ϕ such that
B[λ : ϕ] and ∼ T∗[ϕ : λ]), then λ is not collaborative. As for the sincere agent, we
define strong and weak prejudice with 2 and 3, respectively:
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 −(WCl)λ [I.−(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.40 −(S Cl)λ [I.−(S Cl)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WCl)λR.34 T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (S Cl)λ
R.35 T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S Cl)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WCl)λ
R.5 ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WCl)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (S Cl)λ
R.6 ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S Cl)]
Fair EQ(Aλ,Bλ). A fair agent λ is defined by the equality between the sets of his
announcements and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
T∗[λ : ϕ] if and only if B[λ : ϕ] .
Hence, a fair agent is an agent who believes in everything he announces (⇒) and who
announces only what he believes (⇐). As before, in order to give the rules for MCL,
we first negate the definition of the fair agent. For a non-fair agent λ, there exists a
propositional formula ϕ such that
(∼ T∗[λ : ϕ] and B[λ : ϕ]) or (∼ B[λ : ϕ] and T∗[λ : ϕ]) .
The left and right disjuncts are exactly the definitions of PPi and PP, respectively.
Hence, the introduction and elimination rules have been already considered in the
previous two cases.
Saboteur PO(Aλ,Bλ). A saboteur agent λ is defined by the partial overlap of his
announcements with respect to his beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
B[λ : ϕ] or T∗[λ : ϕ] .
This type of agent may announce something that he believes but also that he does
not believe, or does not announce something he believes.
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.7 −(WI)λ [I.−(WI)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.8 −(S I)λ [I.−(S I)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (S I)λ
R.9 B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(S I)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (S I)λ
R.10 B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(S I)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WI)λ
R.11 T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WI)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (WI)λ
R.12 T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WI)]
Braggart DR(Aλ,Bλ). A braggart agent λ is defined by the discrete-from relation
between his announcements and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ,
∼ T∗[λ : ϕ] or ∼ B[λ : ϕ] .
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This agent only announces what he does not believe and he does not announce what
he believes. Reasoning on the negated definition (i.e., on a non-braggart agent λ for
which there exists a propositional formula ϕ such that T∗[λ : ϕ] and B[λ : ϕ]), we
can define that if (at least once) the agent states something he believes in, then he is
non-braggart.
T3[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ϕ]
R.13 −(WB)λ [I.−(WB)]
T2[λ : ϕ] B[λ : ϕ]
R.14 −(S B)λ [I.−(S B)]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (S B)λ
R.15 ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S B)]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (S B)λ
R.16 ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S B)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WB)λ
R.17 ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WB)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (WB)λ
R.18 ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WB)]
6.1.2 Competence
Competent PP(Bλ,F). An agent’s beliefs are a subset of the true formulae. Hence,
all the agent’s beliefs are facts but there may be true formulae “out” of his beliefs.
An agent λ is competent if, for every propositional formula ϕ, if B[λ : ϕ] then ϕ ∈ F.
B[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.38 −(Co)λ [I. −(Co)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λ
R.33 ϕ [E. +(Co)]
∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (Co)λ
R.19 ¬ϕ [E. +(Co)]
Omniscient PPi(Bλ,F). An agent λ is omniscient if the set of formulae he believes
is a superset of the actually true formulae: for any propositional formula ϕ, if ϕ ∈
F then B[λ : ϕ].
∼ B[λ : ϕ] ϕ
R.37 −(O)λ [I. −(O)]
ϕ + (O)λ
R.32 B[λ : ϕ]
[E. +(O)] ∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (O)λR.20 ¬ϕ [E. +(O)]
Wise EQ(Bλ,F). A wise agent λ is defined by the equality between the sets of his
beliefs and facts, i.e., he only believes in true formulae and knows all the true facts:
for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈ F if and only if B[λ : ϕ]. The rules generated are
exactly the rules of PPi and PP.
Incompetent PO(Bλ,F). An incompetent agent λ is defined by the partial overlap of
his beliefs with the true facts, therefore part of his belief are not facts, and this makes
the agent incompetent: for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈ F or B[λ : ϕ]. This type
of agent believes in true and false formulae, and there exist facts that he does not
believe in, but he won’t believe a false formula ϕ.
¬ϕ ∼ B[λ : ϕ]
R.21 −(In)λ [I. −(In)]
¬ϕ + (In)λ
R.22 B[λ : ϕ]
[E.+(In)] ∼ B[λ : ϕ] + (In)λR.23 ϕ [E.+(In)]
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Ignorant DR(Bλ,F). An ignorant agent λ is defined by the discrete-from relation
between true formulae and beliefs: for any propositional formula ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈ F or ∼
B[λ : ϕ]. Therefore, this agent only believes in false formulae.
ϕ B[λ : ϕ]
R.24 −(Ig)λ [I. −(Ig)]
ϕ + (Ig)λ
R.25 ∼ B[λ : ϕ] [E.+(Ig)]
B[λ : ϕ] + (Ig)λ
R.26 ¬ϕ [E.+(Ig)]
6.1.3 Honesty
Honest PP(Aλ,F). An agent is honest if every formula he asserts is a fact, and the
agent’s assertion are a subset of the true formulae: for any propositional formula ϕ,
if ϕ then T∗[λ : ϕ].
ϕ ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.27 -(WH)λ
[I. -(WH)]
ϕ ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.28 -(S H)λ
[I.-(S H) ]
ϕ + (WH)λ
R.29 T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WH)]
ϕ + (S H)λ
R.30 T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S H)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WH)λ
R.31 ¬ϕ [E.+(WH)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (S H)λ
R.32 ¬ϕ [E.+(S H)]
Oracle PPi(Aλ,F). An agent λ is an oracle if, for any propositional formula ϕ,
if T∗[λ : ϕ] then ϕ ∈ F.
T3[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.33 X
[I. -(WOr) ]
T2[λ : ϕ] ¬ϕ
R.34 X
[I.-(S Or) ]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WOr)λ
R.35 ϕ [E.+(WOr)]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (S Or)λ
R.36 ϕ [E.+(S Or)]
¬ϕ + (WOr)λ
R.37 ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WOr)]
¬ϕ + (S Or)λ
R.38 ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S Or)]
Right EQ(Aλ,F). An agent λ is right if, for any propositional formula ϕ, ϕ ∈
F if and only if T∗[λ : ϕ]. We omit the rules since they are the same as for PP and
PPi.
Incorrect PO(Aλ,F). An agent λ is incorrect if, for any propositional formula ϕ,
ϕ ∈ F or T∗[λ : ϕ]. The announcements of this type of agent might be true or false,
and he only announces part of the facts (i.e., a subset of the facts will never be
announced by him).
¬ϕ ∼ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.39 −(WIr)λ [I. -(WIr) ]
¬ϕ ∼ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.40 −(S Ir)λ [I.-(SIr) ]
¬ϕ + (WIr)λ
R.41 T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WIr)]
¬ϕ + (S Ir)λ
R.42 T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S Ir)]
∼ T3[λ : ϕ] + (WIr)λ
R.43 ϕ [E.+(WIr)]
∼ T2[λ : ϕ] + (S Ir)λ
R.44 ϕ [E.+(S Ir)]
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False DR(Aλ,F). A false agent λ is defined by the discrete-form relation between
true formulae and his assertions, i.e., for any propositional formula ϕ, ¬ϕ ∈ F or ∼
T∗[λ : ϕ]. In other words, everything he announces is false.
ϕ T3[λ : ϕ]
R.45 −(WF )λ [I.−(WF ) ]
ϕ T2[λ : ϕ]
R.46 −(S F )λ [I.−(S F )]
ϕ + (WF )λ
R.47 ∼ T3[λ : ϕ] [E.+(WF )]
ϕ + (S F )λ
R.48 ∼ T2[λ : ϕ] [E.+(S F )]
T3[λ : ϕ] + (WF )λ
R.49 ¬ϕ [E.+(WF )]
T2[λ : ϕ] + (S F )λ
R.50 ¬ϕ [E.+(S F )]
6.2 On the Topology of MAS
In this section, we justify the use of RCC5 instead of RCC3 or RCC8, and discuss
the relation between the topology we consider and the agent types.
6.2.1 RCC3, RCC5, and RCC8
There exist three different types of RCC, based on the number of topological relations
considered: RCC3, RCC5, and RCC8. RCC3 considers the three different topological
relations listed in Table 6.1: ONE, EQ, and DR. The topological relations EQ and DR
are the same as in RCC5 (see Table 6.1), whereas ONE defines the overlap relation
between two regions with the additional constraint that the regions cannot be fully
overlapping (i.e., they cannot be two exact copies of the same region).
The relation ONE in RCC3 is detailed in RCC5 with the relations PP, PPi, and
PO. Hence, considering RCC5 instead of RCC3 results in a more accurate and ex-
pressive categorization of agents. However, the same reasoning cannot be applied to
RCC8. In fact, even if RCC8 is more detailed than RCC5 as it considers more topo-
logical relations, the additional topological relations considered by RCC8 cannot be
applied for the categorization of agents in MCL. As showed in Table 6.1, RCC8
considers tangential connections, where, informally, two tangential regions are near
enough so that no other region can fit between the two (without overlapping them),
but are not overlapping at any point. This is formalized by the EC relation. In addi-
tion, in RCC8, each of the two relations PP and PPi is detailed into tangential and
non-tangential.
In our work, the elements of the three sets A, B and F are not ordered. In other
words, we are not considering the distance between those elements (or between re-
gions containing those elements). Hence, given any pair of (sub-)sets between A, B
and F, regardless of the sets being near or far apart between each other, we consider
them as disjoint (i.e., DR).
6.2.2 An Upper bound on the Number of Different Types of Agents
Applying RCC over a finite number of sets, we obtain a definite number of resulting
combinations. Hence, applying RCC over Aλ,Bλ,F, we obtain a definite number of
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Table 6.2. RCC3 composition table with respect to 3 sets. T(X, Z) = {DR(X, Z), EQ(X, Z),
ONE(X, Z)}
DR(X, Y) EQ(X, Y) ONE(X, Z)
DR(Y , Z) T(X, Z) DR(X, Z) DR(X, Z)
ONE(X,Z)
EQ(Y , Z) DR(X, Z) EQ(Y , Z) ONE(Y , Z)
ONE(Y , Z) DR(X, Z) ONE(X, Z) T(X, Z)
ONE(X,Z)
Table 6.3. RCC5 composition table over 3 sets. The results show that there exist 54 possible
relations. T(X,Z) = {DR(X,Z), PO(X,Z), EQ(X,Z), PP(X,Z), PPi(X,Z)}
DR(X, Y) PO(X, Y) EQ(X, Y) PPi(X, Y) PP(X, Y)
DR(Y , Z) T(X, Z)
DR(X, Z)
DR(X, Z)
DR(X, Z)
DR(X, Z)PO(X, Z) PO(X, Z)
PP(X, Z) PP(X, Z)
PO(Y , Z)
DR(X, Z)
T(X, Z) PO(X, Z)
PO(X, Z) DR(X, Z)
PO(X, Z) PPi(X, Z) PO(X, Z)
PP(X, Z) PP(X, Z)
EQ(X, Z) DR(X, Z) PO(X, Z) EQ(X, Z) PPi(X, Z) PP(X, Z)
PP(Y , Z)
DR(X, Z)
PP(X, Z)
PO(X, Z)
PP(X, Z)PO(X, Z) PO(X, Z) EQ(X, Z)
PP(X, Z) PP(X, Z) PP(X, Z)
PPi(X, Z)
PPi(Y , Z) DR(X, Z)
DR(X, Z)
PPi(X, Z) PPi(X, Z) T(X, Z)PO(X, Z)
PPi(X, Z)
different types of agents. In this section, we show the general upper bound on the
number of different agents with respect to the type of RCC (RCC5, RCC3 or RCC8)
considered.
The general formula to calculate the number of different types of agents is r(
n
k),
where r is the number of relations with arity k, between n different sets, where re
is the number of permutation of r relations over e elements with repetitions, with
e being the number of k-ary combinations of n sets,
(
n
k
)
. In our case,
(
n
k
)
= 3 since
we consider 3 sets (A,B,F), and all the relations considered in the RCC are binary.
Hence, using RCC5 (with five different spatial relations) over three sets, we can
theoretically define up to 125 different type of agents. However, only 54 of the 125
(as showed in [13] and derived by the composition table of RCC5 in Table 6.3)
combinations are topologically correct with respect to the definition of the relations
of RCC5. Generalizing to all the RCCs, in Table 6.4 we calculate the number of
different agents with respect to all the variations of RCC (i.e., with 3, 5 or 8 spatial
relations).
• RCC3 — theoretical: 33 = 27, correct: 15. (see Table 6.2): 15
• RCC5 — theoretical: 53 = 125, correct: 54. (see Table 6.3): 54
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Theoretical Correct
RCC3 33 = 27 15
RCC5 53 = 125 54
RCC8 83 = 512 193
Table 6.4. Number of agents with re-
spect to different RCC
Sensor
Sensor
42.42
Tank
Motorized
valve
PLC
Pump
Fig. 6.2. Representation of the test case
• RCC8 — theoretical: 83 = 512, correct: 193. (see Table 6.7): 193
Hence, even if considering a different number of sets than the three A, B and F expo-
nentially affects the number of theoretical agents, the application of RCC downscales
that number of a factor that ranges from 1.8 to 2.5. In addition, using RCC5 we con-
sider 3.6 times more (different) types of agents than RCC3, but using RCC8 would
allow us to consider 3.5 times more different agents.
6.3 Systems of Communicating Agents
In this section, we show that both the framework and the categorization of agents
that we have given can be applied to reason about the security of CPS.
6.3.1 Cyber-Physical Systems
We use the term CPS to refer to systems that consist of networked embedded sys-
tems, which are used to sense, actuate, and control physical processes. Examples of
CPS include industrial water treatment facilities and power plants. CPS have seen a
rapid increase in automation and connectivity, which threatens to increase their vul-
nerability to malicious attacks. Let us now use our approach to address the problem
of defining security-related attack states for CPS.
Description of the Case Study. Similarly to [14, 22], we consider a CPS (depicted
in Fig. 6.2) to be composed by five agents:
• A tank containing water.
• A controller (e.g., a PLC) that controls the water level so that the tank does not
(underflow or) overflow.
• A water level indicator (e.g., a Sensor) that communicates the readings of the
level of the water inside the tank to the PLC.
• A motorized valve and a pump that (controlled by the PLC) regulate the inflow
and outflow of water respectively.
Mapping A, B, and F to CPS. It is possible that the three sets A, B and F contain at
the same time different formulae that contain each element of the topological space
ϕ. Hence, every assertion and belief must be objective (since it can be part of F).
This implies that formulae like ϕ := highLevel(tank,water) cannot be considered in
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Table 6.5. Example of attack states for the water level sensor
State of the sensor (A,B) (B,F) (A,F)
optimal EQ EQ EQ
sensor compromised EQ DR DR
communication compromised DR EQ DR
fully compromised DR DR DR
our reasoning since “high” is considered to be subjective. In contrast, we can use
objective formulae such as ϕ := level(tank,20L).
When considering a CPS (and security systems in general, e.g., security proto-
cols) as a MAS, the message exchange between different agents can be formalized by
means of assertions. In addition, redundant channels are often employed to reduce
security treats (or assertions are required over multiple channels as, e.g., in two-factor
authentication) and then it is fair to assume that assertions can be done over single or
multiple channels. Finally, the inspection of the memory of any software/hardware of
the CPS (supposing a white-box analysis) reveals the actual beliefs, while the facts
in a CPS are defined by the physical laws of the physics. We can summarize our
mapping as follows:
• Aλ defines the values communicated by the agent λ.
• Bλ defines the computational results of the agent λ.
• F defines the environmental values, i.e., the real values of the system.
6.3.2 Single-Channel Attack states
We are now in a position to show that we can directly apply our topological catego-
rization to any agent in our CPS. For simplicity, we first use only the RCC5 relations
EQ and DR, and then extend our results to all RCC5 relations.
Optimal System Status. Suppose that the tank contains 20L of water, e.g.,
level(tank,20L) ∈ F, where level is a predicate, and tank and 20L are propositional
constants. For the sake of simplicity, we also suppose that the system is in idle (both
the motorized valve and the pump are off). When the system is not compromised, the
sensor correctly computes the level of the water in the tank (e.g., level(tank,20L) ∈
Bsensor) and correctly communicates to the PLC the computed value of water in the
tank (e.g., level(tank,20L) ∈ Asensor). We can then define the optimal status of the
sensor as the triple 〈EQ(Asensor,Bsensor),EQ(Bsensor,F),EQ(Asensor,F)〉.
System Under Attack. Suppose that the sensor is communicating wrong values to
the PLC (i.e, DR(Asensor,F)). As showed in Table 6.5, we have three mutually exclu-
sive cases:
1. The sensor is working properly EQ(Bsensor,F), therefore (topologically) the
communication between the sensor and the PLC has been compromised, i.e.,
DR(Asensor,Bsensor).
2. The communication between the sensor and the PLC has not been compro-
mised EQ(Asensor,Bsensor), therefore the sensor is not sending what it computes
DR(Bsensor,F).
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3. Both the communication and the sensor have been compromised.
As a consequence of the discussion in Section 6.2.2, between the optimal and the
fully compromised status of the sensor there must be 52 other different statuses. We
can generalize the attack states into three main categories, as follows:
• RCC5(A,B) expresses the relation between the values communicated and the
ones computed by an agent.
• RCC5(B,F) expresses the relation between the values computed and the true
environmental values.
• RCC5(A,F) expresses the relation between the values communicated and the
true environmental values.
Defense mechanisms that check sudden changes in physical readings (see [29] for
an example of how this is defined in MAS with logical systems) are often adopted
in CPS. To bypass the security mechanisms, during an attack, the optimal status will
likely pass through most of the 52 intermediate statuses.
6.3.3 Multiple-Channel Attack States
A countermeasure often applied in CPS (but not limited to CPS) is the implementa-
tion of redundant channels. As proposed in [23], in our case study one could imple-
ment a dedicated system that interprets the readings of the sensor and directly closes
the motorized valve if an upper threshold is reached. We can leverage the modal
operators to define such communications and to define even more sophisticated at-
tack states. For example, given a state Asensor,Bsensor,F in MCL, we can check if
one or all the channels that the sensor uses to communicate with the PLC have been
compromised, as defined in (1) and (2) respectively:
{Asensor,Bsensor,F} ` −(S Fair)sensor (6.1)
{Asensor,Bsensor,F} ` −(WFair)sensor (6.2)
Based on the approach we have proposed in this thesis, we can formalize the
optimal/attack states of a CPS, reason on the properties of the CPS by means of
prejudices in MCL, and obtain therefore a control upon the concept of redundancy as
expressed above. Our approach is not specific to CPS but can potentially be applied
to any MAS (as long as the elements of the topological space are objective).
6.3.4 Channels
In order to extend our work to consider systems of communicating agents, in this
section, we introduce the notion of channel. Informally, a channel identifies the place
where the communication takes place. In the following of this section we define
“one-directional” and “bi-directional” channels.
Mono-directional channels are channels where the communications (i.e., the ex-
change of information) between two agents flows only from one agent to the other but
not vice versa. We denote mono-directional channels with→. For example, λS → λR
defines a mono-directional channel between the two agents λS , λR where only λS
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communicates information to λR and λR only receives messages but does not com-
municate to λS . More formally, in MCL, we first categorize the two agents λS and
λR with respect to the sets:AS ,BS ,AR,BR,F; as follows.
λS = {RCC51(AλS ,BλS ),RCC52(BλS ,F),RCC53(AλS ,F)}.
λR = {RCC54(AλR ,BλR ),RCC55(BλR ,F),RCC56(AλR ,F)}.
However, the relations between A,B,F does not allow us to define the channel be-
tween the two agents. Therefore, in order to model the channel, we introduce the
following notation (defined in MCL):
Definition 1 Mono-directional channel. A mono-directional channel is defined
by the message sent and received over the channel. AλS ,λR , defines the sending
of information over a mono-directional channel between λS and λR, written as
λS → λR. AλS ,λR is defined as a (improper) subset of the assertions of λS , i.e.
PP(AλS ,λR ,AλS )∨EQ(AλS ,λR ,AλS ) (since λS may communicate with other agents).
The receipt of messages over a mono-directional channel is defined as the topolog-
ical boundary BS ,R (improper) subset of the beliefs of the receiver (i.e., the beliefs
generated by the message exchange and by computations over the set of beliefs):
PP(BS ,R,BR)∨EQ(BS ,R,BR).
As an example, in an ideal system where there exist only two agents λS and λR that
communicates over a mono-directional channel from λS → λR, and where the agent R
extends his beliefs only with the message it receives, the system of communicating
agent is defined by the tuple 〈Aλs,λR ,BλS ,BλS ,λR ,F〉. We can exclude AλR since λR
does not communicate with any other agent.
Definition 2 System of communicating agents Sab f .
Sab f , 〈Aλ0λ j , . . . ,Aλnλm ,Bλ0, . . . ,Bλk,F〉
where j,n,m,k ∈ N are indexes identifying different agents (i.e., j , n , m , k).
As a more concrete example, we consider the architecture in Figure 6.3.4 where
a sender and a receiver (whose behavior is depicted as a transition system) are com-
municating through a mono-direction channel sender→ receiver. The sender senses
the data of a physical component. The relation between the beliefs of the sender (i.e.,
what the sender compute) and the set of facts (i.e., F) determines the relation between
the real physical status of the physical component and what the sender senses. For
example, if the physical component is a tank containing 50l of water, the sensor may
sense the level of the water inside the tank. The sender outputs (to the port indicated
with O in the figure) the data on the As,r channel and the receiver only receives input
from the sender (from the port indicated with I in the figure). The rest of the relation
are intuitive and depicted in Figure 6.3.4:
• (AS ,R,F), expresses the relation between the information exchanged in the chan-
nel and the true fact of the physical components of the system.
• (AS ,R,BS ), expresses the relation between the information exchanged over the
channel and the ones computed by the sender (i.e., the sensed data).
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• (AS ,R,BR), since there is no other source of information for the receiver, this re-
lation expresses the difference between what the receiver receives and produces
by computation.
• (BS ,BR), expresses the difference between the computed data by S and R. In
general, agents (i.e., components) that implements different behaviors, generates
different beliefs even if the initial set of beliefs is the same. However, there exist
specific configurations (e.g., components implementing the same logic/behavior)
where this relation can be interesting to analyze. For example, in a redundant
setting the relation between beliefs of the two agents (or systems of agents) can
be analyzed to understand if any misalignment occurred.
• (BR,F), expresses the difference between the data computed by R and the true
fact of the physical components of the system.
sender receiver
O I
physical 
component
sensor
Fig. 6.3. The architecture of λS → λR.
For the definition of bi-directional channels we rely on the definition of mono-
directional channel, and a bi-directional channel is defined as the union of two (op-
posite) mono-directional channels.
Definition 3 Bi-directional channel A bi-directional channel λi ↔ λ j between the
two agents λi,λ j is defined as the two mono-directional channels λ0→ λ1, λ1→ λ0.
6.3.5 Channel properties
We define different security properties over a mono-directional channel (the exten-
sion to a bi-directional channel is straightforward given that a bi-directional channel
is defined as two mono-directional channels).
We first recall the informal definition of CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Avail-
ability) security properties:
• Confidentiality of a channel guarantees that no agent but the intended recipient
will be able to understand the information exchanged over the channel.
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• Availability of information/service over a channel guarantees that whenever an
agent want to retrieve an information/service, the information/service will be
provided.
• Integrity of a channel guarantees that if the information exchanged over that
channel are modified, these modification are detected.
The RCC5 calculus allow us to reason on the security configuration of a mono-
directional channel as we describe in Table 6.6. In particular, the relation between the
assertions sent to the mono-directional channel (i.e., AλS ,λR ) and the ones received
(i.e., BλS ,λR ).
Definition Relation Representation
Ideal (no attacks) EQ(AλS ,λR ,BλS ,λR ) λS // λR
Availability violation
(e.g., Denial of service attack)
DR (AλS ,λR ,BλS ,λR ) λS / // λR
Confidentiality & Integrity violation
(e.g., Man-in-the-middle attack)
PO(AλS ,λR ,BλS ,λR )
λS //
<<
λR<<
Confidentiality violation:
the adversary intercepts messages
before they reach their destination
PPi(AλS ,λR ,BλS ,λR )
λS //
<<
λR
Integrity violation:
someone fakes to be the sender
PP(AS R,BR) λS // λR<<
Table 6.6. Channel Properties
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7ABF Tool
In this section, we describe the implementation and the necessary theoretical back-
ground of the ABF tool. The tool is general enough to be used as a basis for any
implementation of provers (e.g., theorem provers) on topological boundaries in a
topological space. In particular, we created a tool to identify all (or a selection of) the
possible configurations of a system of agents defined satisfiable in the ABF theory.
We implemented the RCC5 theory in the Z3 SMT solver (in Python) and defined
ABF agents as regions in a topological space. This allow us to quantitatively rea-
soning on systems of communicating agents, studying the possible secure and non-
secure configurations of a system of communicating agents. The full implementation
of the tool is reported in Appendix A. The basic idea is to encode in the SMT-LIB
language (input language of most SMT solver) the concept of topological boundary
(a subset of a topological space), the RCC5 calculus, and then to encode agents as
regions.
O I
perfect
channel
SENSOR PLC
TANK
SYSTEM MODEL
ABF TOPOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES 
ABF TOOL
Python:
THEORIES
UNFOLDING Z3
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output
Fig. 7.1. The ABF tool.
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7.1 Implementation of the Region Connection Calculus
In Section 6, we defined agents as a tuple of relations between three topological
boundaries A,B,F. We define a topological boundary a Sort in Z3 in order to de-
fine the theory of a topological space over the domain (i.e., the sort) of topological
boundary. We do not refer to topology or topological space explicitly in the imple-
mentation of the tool and the notion of boundary could be abstracted into the more
high-level concept of region. However, this would not change the detail of the results
but would have slightly complicated the implementation.
In Listing 7.1 we define the topological boundary as a sort and three generic
topological boundaries X,Y,X that will be used afterward in this section to define the
RCC5 calculus.
Listing 7.1. Definition of topological boundary as a sort
1 Boundary = D e c l a r e S o r t ( ’ Boundary ’ )
2
3 X = Const ( ’X’ , Boundary )
4 Y = Const ( ’Y’ , Boundary )
5 Z = Const ( ’ Z ’ , Boundary )
The RCC5 is defined by the five relations: equality, discrete from, partial overlap,
proper part, and the inverse of proper part. Those five relations are, in turn, defined
over the concept of parts (mereological representation) or from the more basic con-
cept of connected boundaries (topology). We define here the RCC5 over the concept
of connected spaces but, for performance purposes, our results are based on the mere-
ological implementation. In Listing 7.2, we define the terms that identify the RCC5
relations as Boolean (uninterpreted) functions R(X,X)→ {True,False} that takes as
input two topological boundaries X, where R can be any of the following relations:
connects with (C), part of (P), overlaps (O), equal to (EQ), discrete from (DR), partial
overlap (PO), proper part of (PP), inverse of proper part of (PPi).
Listing 7.2. RCC5 relations
1 C = F u n c t i o n ( ’C’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
2 P = F u n c t i o n ( ’ P ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
3 O = F u n c t i o n ( ’O’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
4 EQ = F u n c t i o n ( ’EQ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
5 DR = F u n c t i o n ( ’DR’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
6 PO = F u n c t i o n ( ’PO’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
7 PP = F u n c t i o n ( ’ PP ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
8 PPi= F u n c t i o n ( ’ PPi ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
We define in Listing 7.3, the semantics of the various relations, where X,Y,Z are
topological boundaries, as follows:
• the parthood relation connects with (primitive binary inclusion relation) as a
reflexive (i.e., ∀X,C(X,X) where X is a topological boundary) and symmetric
(i.e., ∀X,Y C(X,Y)→C(Y,X)) relations
• Part of (P): ∀X,Y P(X,Y)↔∀ZC(Z,X)→C(Z,Y)
• Overlaps (O): ∀X,Y O(X,Y)↔∃ZP(Z,X)∧P(Z,Y)
• Equal to (EQ): ∀X,Y EQ(X,Y)↔ P(X,Y)∧P(Y,X)
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• Discrete from (FR): ∀X,Y DR(X,Y)↔¬O(X,Y)
• Partial overlap (PO): ∀X,Y PO(X,Y)↔ O(X,Y)∧¬P(X,Y)∧¬P(Y,X)
• Proper part of (PP): ∀X,YPP(X,Y)↔ P(X,Y)∧¬P(Y,X)
• Inverse of proper part of (PPi) ∀X,YPPi(X,Y)↔ P(Y,X)↔¬P(X,Y)
Listing 7.3. Implementation of the semantics of RCC5
1 r e f l e x i v i t y =F o r A l l (X, C(X, X) )
2 symmetry=F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , I m p l i e s (C(X, Y) , C(Y,X) ) )
3 p a r t o f =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , P (X,Y) == F o r A l l ( Z , I m p l i e s (C( Z ,X) ,
C( Z ,Y) ) ) )
4 o v e r l a p s =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , O(X,Y) == E x i s t s ( Z , And ( P ( Z ,X) ,
P ( Z ,Y) ) ) )
5 e q u a l t o =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , EQ(X,Y) == And ( P (X,Y) , P (Y,X) ) )
6 d i s c r e t e f r o m =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , DR(X,Y) == Not (O(X,Y) ) )
7 p a r t i a l o v e r l a p =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PO(X,Y) == And (O(X,Y) ,
Not ( P (X,Y) ) , Not ( P (Y,X) ) ) )
8 p r o p e r p a r t =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PP (X,Y) == And ( P (X,Y) ,
Not ( P (Y,X) ) ) )
9 p r o p e r p a r t i =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PPi (X,Y) == And ( P (Y,X) ,
Not ( P (X,Y) ) ) )
In Listing 7.4 we create (lines 1 and 2) a new Z3 solver variable s that contains
a conjunction of all the formulas defining RCC5 (i.e., the theory of RCC5). In lines
4–6 we create three constants of type Boundary representing the three sets A, B, and
F. We then create a list (a Python dictionary) of the five RCC5 relations in line 8
so that, in lines 15, 17, and 19 we can loop over all the possible combinations of
RCC5 relations on the three sets A, B, and F (i.e., R(A,B), R(B,F), R(A,F) where
R is any RCC5 relation). For each combination we create an agent (line 22) that
we add to the solver (line 24, 25). We then check the satisfiability of the agent (i.e.,
of the combination of RCC5 relations over the three sets A, B, F). The remaining
lines of code (from line 27 on) prints the output and keeps counters on how many
configurations are satisfiable and how many are not.
Listing 7.4. Implementation of Agents
1 s = S o l v e r ( )
2 s . add ( And ( r e f l e x i v i t y , symmetry , p a r t o f , p r o p e r p a r t ,
p r o p e r p a r t i , p a r t i a l o v e r l a p , d i s c r e t e f r o m ,
e q u a l t o , o v e r l a p s ) )
3
4 A = Const ( ’A’ , Boundary )
5 B = Const ( ’B’ , Boundary )
6 F = Const ( ’ F ’ , Boundary )
7
8 r c c 5 = { ’ eq ’ : EQ, ’ pp ’ : PP , ’ ppi ’ : PPi , ’ po ’ : PO , ’ dr ’ : DR}
9
10 c o u n t e r =1
11 c o u n t e r s a t =0
12 c o u n t e r u n s a t =0
13 coun te r unknown =0
14
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15 f o r i i n r c c 5 :
16 r1= r c c 5 [ i ] ( A, B)
17 f o r j i n r c c 5 :
18 r2= r c c 5 [ j ] ( B , F )
19 f o r k i n r c c 5 :
20 r3= r c c 5 [ k ] ( A, F )
21
22 a g e n t=And ( r1 , r2 , r3 )
23
24 s . push ( )
25 s . add ( a g e n t )
26 check=s . check ( )
27 o f f s e t 1 = ’ ’*(5− l e n ( s t r ( c o u n t e r ) ) )
28 o f f s e t 2 = ’ ’*(12− l e n ( s t r ( check ) ) )
29 p r i n t (”%d %s %s %s %s ”%( c o u n t e r , o f f s e t 1 , check ,
o f f s e t 2 , a g e n t ) )
30
31 i f ( check == u n s a t ) :
32 c o u n t e r u n s a t +=1
33 i f ( check == unknown ) :
34 coun te r unknown+=1
35 i f ( check == s a t ) :
36 c o u n t e r s a t +=1
37
38 s . pop ( )
39 c o u n t e r +=1
40
41 p r i n t ( ” \ n ********\nSTATISTICS\n\ n a g e n t s=%d
\ n s a t=%d\ n u n s a t=%d\nunknown=%d”%( c o u n t e r −1 ,
c o u n t e r s a t , c o u n t e r u n s a t , coun te r unknown ) )
As mentioned before in this section we also implemented a slightly modified
version in which we used the PO relation as the basic building block of RCC5 (i.e.,
mereotopological representation) instead of starting from the notion of “connected
with”. The PO relation has been implemented as shown in Listing 7.5. The two vari-
ants do not differ in terms of results.
Listing 7.5. Alternative implementation of PO relation
1 r e f l e x i v i t y =F o r A l l (X, P (X,X) )
2 a n t i s y m m e t r y=F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , I m p l i e s ( And ( P (X,Y) , P (Y,X) ) ,
X==Y) )
3 t r a n s i t i v i t y =F o r A l l ( [ X, Y, Z ] , I m p l i e s ( And ( P (X,Y) , P (Y, Z ) ) ,
P (X, Z ) ) )
7.2 Experiment and Results
We first used our tool to understand how many different configurations of systems of
communicating agents with respect to our theory. The tool, as developed in Section 7
do not terminate even for a system with 2 agents with unidirectional communication.
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SM Sets Agents Permut. Config. N. Sat
λS A,B,F 1 5 53=125 54
λS → λR AλS λR ,BλS ,BλR ,F 2 6 56=15.625 1.191
λS ↔ λR AλS λR ,AλRλS ,BλS ,BλR ,F 2 10 510=9.765.625 51.345
Table 7.1. ABF tool System Model configurations
We then modified the code in order to unfold the quantifiers over the finite number
of sets defining the system of communicating agents. With this tuning, we managed
to enumerate the configurations in Table 7.1. Showing how rapidly the number of
configurations grows even if we just introduce one (unidirectional) channel, i.e. from
around 1200 to more than 51000 configurations. In the first row (with 1 agent), we
recall that one agent has 54 different configurations.
7.2.1 Two agents - unidirectional channel
Categorization AgentS ChannelS R
Collaboration Competence Honesty Constraint
(AS R,BS ) (BS ,F) (AS R,F) (AS R,BS ,R)
PP Sincere Competent Honest No Authentication
PPi Collaborative Omniscient Oracle Interception
EQ Fair Wise Right Ideal
PO Saboteur Incompetent Incorrect Vulnerable
DR Braggart Ignorant False No communication
Table 7.2. ABF – Properties of agents
An unidirectional channel can only have five different configurations in RCC5.
In Table 7.2, we report the different configurations of the channel compared to the
collaboration, competence, and honesty of the agent. Of the 1191 different configu-
rations we investigated those where a Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) is present,
i.e., adding the constraint that Only some of the informations reaches the intended
recipient: PO(Asr,Br). The ABF tool identified 318 different configurations of the
system. These configurations represent the different MITM specializations. For ex-
ample, one specialization of the MITM is the selective forwarding attack where an
attacker drops some of the packets traveling over the network. In order to study the
selective forwarding attack we introduced the following constraints.
• (MITM) Only some of the informations reaches the intended recipient: PO(AS ,R,BS ,R)
• Anything the sender believes is fact: PP(BS ,F)
• Anything the receiver believes is a fact: PP(BS ,R,F)
• Anything the sender announce is a fact: PP(AS ,R,F)
Since there is no believes that do not correspond to a fact and there is no commu-
nication from the sender to the receiver that is not a fact but not all the information
reaches the intended recipient, it means that part of the communication was dropped
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1 EQ(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PO(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
2 PP(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) Pi(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
2 PP(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PO(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
4 Pi(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PP(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
5 Pi(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PO(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
6 Pi(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) DR(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
7 PO(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) EQ(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
8 PO(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PP(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
9 PO(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) Pi(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
10 PO(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PO(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
11 PO(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) DR(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
12 DR(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PP(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
13 DR(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) PO(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
14 DR(Asr, Bs) PO(Asr, Bsr) PP(Asr, F) DR(Bs, Bsr) PP(Bs, F) PP(Bsr, F)
Table 7.3. Selective forwards attack states
(i.e., selective forwarding). Our tool returns the 14 configurations summarized in
Table 7.3 where the four contraints for the selective forwards are fixed and the rela-
tions Asr,Bs and Bs,Bsr changes. The relation Bs, Bsr are meaningful only when
the sender and receiver implement the same behavior, for example when an attacker
performs traffic analysis and compares the behavior of one of the nodes he controls
with another node he does not control. The relation between Asr and Bs tells us how
much of the messages sent by S reaches the receiver, as follows.
• EQ, all the messages sent on the channel reaches the receiver and the receiver
only receives messages from the sender.
• PP, all the message sent on the channel reaches the receiver but the receiver
receives messages from other sources.
• PPi, only some of the messages sent on the channel reaches the receiver (some
are lost) but the receiver does not receive messages from other sources.
• PO, part of the messages sent by the sender are lost, part are received, and the
receiver receives messages from other sources.
• DR, the receiver only receives messages from other sources.
Part IV
State of the art
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There is a rather long research stream on the problem of aligning beliefs and
announcements, that starts from Dynamic Epistemic Logic. See [31], for a general
framework analysis in the early stage of Public Announcement Logics (PAL), and
recent development in [2, 3, 28]. Although these scholars have deeply dealt with the
problem of announcements, they have made a very strong, and clearly oversimplified
assumption: agents are always truthful and sincere. As a consequence, an observer
on a communication channel always trusts the agents making announcements on
that channel. In recent developments on PAL, the possibility that an announcement is
made producing changes in beliefs of agents is provided in the form of belief revision
operators: whenever an agent belief contrasts with what announced, he revises his
knowledge base [3].
On the other hand, there have been meany scholars who concentrated their atten-
tion upon the ways in which agents communicate false announcements, as recently
analysed in [32].
Back to early stage investigations on Public Announcements, the idea that some-
one could forecast others’ lies is incorporated within the logic itself [4]. A more
recent study focused on communication, and introduces, in a different way with re-
spect to the approach we adopted here, a notion of channel [26]. The framework is
Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Authors consider only truthful communications. A mes-
sage can be sent only if the sender knows that the message is true. Agents cannot lie.
Agents communicate by sending messages to a group of other agents. This is dis-
tinct from passing on channels where: (i.) The agent can choose on which channels
say what, (ii.) the agent has not control on who is looking at those channels, he thus
does not have control on who can access his announcement. The authors deal with
updating the knowledge of each agent after a message has been sent.
In [7], authors dealt with the problem of how to express a semantics for Agent
Communication Logic in order to make non-monotonic inferences on the ground of
speech acts. The above mentioned researches have exploited the flaws we referred
to in this thesis. Some attempts to solve these flaws have been proposed in [5, 6, 10,
11, 19, 27, 33]. Although interesting perspectives, the focus of those papers and their
aims share little with the purpose of this work.
The most comprehensive investigation about lying agents, from the viewpoint of
agent communication logical framework is [32].
First things first, what author considers a lie? You lie to me that p, if you believe
that p is false while you say that p, and with the intention that I believe p.
This is the first strong difference between the two approaches. An agent’s be-
liefs are typically private, as such another agent can only guess if an agent believes
something or not. Therefore, lying in our framework is based on just what an agent
announces; an agent thus lies if he announces p as well as ¬p on (possibly) different
channels.
The author claims that a lying agent considers that p is false when he announces
it. We value this viewpoint not exhaustive. If an agent has not any knowledge re-
garding p nor ¬p but he announces p on a channel while ¬p on (possibly) another
channel, we say that even in this situation that agent is lying. (In [32], the author calls
it bluffing, whereas we have named it incompetent.)
Another strong difference is that a lie is successful if the recipient of the lie
ends up believing in its truthfulness (provided the type of this recipient agent, that is
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credulous, sceptical, or revising). Even if we can understand the author aim, we do
not agree on it. A lie is a lie, independently on whether, after it has been told, some
agents end up in believing in it. If you announce that the authors of this work are
females, we shall not believe it, but we know that you are a liar (or a joker in a more
sympathetic scenario).
An agent observing the communication channels is not really interested in what
the beliefs of another agent are, but rather on what is said on the channels under
his observation. The information he uses by his deduction process can therefore rely
exclusively on those announcements, his knowledge and his own beliefs, and he can
combine all such information to make his own prejudices about the other agents.
To complete this short analysis of the reference literature, an important investi-
gation regards complexity of reasoning in PAL. In [18], the author proves two inter-
esting results: Satisfiability in single-agent PAL is NP-complete and in multi-agent
PAL is PSpace-complete.
Part V
Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis, we dealt with the problem of combining beliefs and announcements
in a framework that also allows to provide prejudices about agent communication
attitudes. The basic results we obtained are: (i.) a formalisation of the modal logic
MCL which allows to express facts, beliefs and announcements, (ii.) the analysis of
a semantics for this logic, (iii.) we proposed a topological categorization of agents
for MCL using RCC5, (iv.) we defined an upper bound on the number of different
agents in a MAS, and (v.) we applied our results to the security of CPS. Moreover,
we showed that our results can be used to address the problem of defining attack
states for CPS. We then defined a system of communicating agents in MCL along
with mono- and bi-directional channels. We provided the details of the ABF tool that
accepts a configuration of a system of communicating agents (defined in MCL) as
input and returns the possible configurations of the system.
As stated in Chapter 3, we have based our work on the stream of extensions to
Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in particular referring to PAL, which was originally pro-
posed by Plaza in [20]. The basis of our approach has been to quit the oversimplified
assumption of truthfulness of agents. Issues about truthfulness of agents have often
been dealt with in PAL and other agent-based logic approaches, as in [34].
There are several ways in which this research can be taken further. We are look-
ing at extensions to the logical framework to cover partially observable channels
that include temporal aspects and access permissions. Agent tags presented in Sec-
tion 4.1 might be refined. For instance, an agent can be considered insincere only
when announcing the opposite of a belief of hers, while an agent making a state-
ment on which he has no knowledge of truthfulness might be classified as braggart.
Furthermore, we plan to study and implement the RCC3 and RCC8 calculi. RCC3
would provide less precision but also less complexity and then higher performances
of the ABF Tool. On the contrary, RCC8 would provide higher precision but also
higher complexity. In order to apply the tool to more extensive case studies and to
detail the security properties as intentions/intents of the agents, correlating our work
with the BDI (Belief, Desire, Intent) framework.
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AImplementation of the ABF tool
1 from z3 i m p o r t *
2
3 Boundary = D e c l a r e S o r t ( ’ Boundary ’ )
4
5 X = Const ( ’X’ , Boundary )
6 Y = Const ( ’Y’ , Boundary )
7 Z = Const ( ’ Z ’ , Boundary )
8
9 C = F u n c t i o n ( ’C’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
10 P = F u n c t i o n ( ’ P ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
11 O = F u n c t i o n ( ’O’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
12 EQ = F u n c t i o n ( ’EQ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
13 DR = F u n c t i o n ( ’DR’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
14 PO = F u n c t i o n ( ’PO’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
15 PP = F u n c t i o n ( ’ PP ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
16 PPi= F u n c t i o n ( ’ PPi ’ , Boundary , Boundary , B o o l S o r t ( ) )
17
18 ################################
19 # CONNECTS WITH
20 # d e f i n e h e r e t h e p a r t h o o d r e l a t i o n C ( p r i m i t i v e b i n a r y
i n c l u s i o n r e l a t i o n c a l l e d c o n n e c t s w i th )
21 # which i s r e f l e x i v e and a n t i s y m m e t r i c
22 ################################
23
24 r e f l e x i v i t y =F o r A l l (X, C(X, X) )
25 symmetry=F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , I m p l i e s (C(X, Y) , C(Y,X) ) )
26 # e x t e n s i o n a l i t y = F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , I m p l i e s ( F o r A l l ( Z , C( Z , X)
== C( Z , Y) ) , X == Y) )
27
28 ################################
29 # PART OF
30 # P (X,Y) : f o r a l l Z C( Z ,X) => C( Z ,Y)
31 ################################
32
33 p a r t o f =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , P (X,Y) == F o r A l l ( Z , I m p l i e s (C( Z ,X) ,
C( Z ,Y) ) ) )
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34
35 ################################
36 # OVERLAPS
37 # O(X,Y) : e x i s t s Z P ( Z , X) / \ P ( Z , Y)
38 ################################
39
40 o v e r l a p s =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , O(X,Y) == E x i s t s ( Z , And ( P ( Z ,X) ,
P ( Z ,Y) ) ) )
41
42 ################################
43 # EQUAL TO
44 # E (X,Y) : P (X, Y ) / \ P (Y, X )
45 ################################
46
47 e q u a l t o =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , EQ(X,Y) == And ( P (X,Y) , P (Y,X) ) )
48
49 ################################
50 # DISCRETE FROM
51 # DR(X,Y) : n o t O(X,Y)
52 ################################
53
54 d i s c r e t e f r o m =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , DR(X,Y) == Not (O(X,Y) ) )
55
56 ################################
57 # PARTIAL OVERLAP
58 # PO(X,Y) : O(X, Y) / \ ( n o t P (X, Y) ) / \ ( n o t P (Y, X) )
59 ################################
60
61 p a r t i a l o v e r l a p =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PO(X,Y) == And (O(X,Y) ,
Not ( P (X,Y) ) , Not ( P (Y,X) ) ) )
62
63 ################################
64 # PROPER PART OF
65 # PP (X,Y) : P (X, Y) / \ ( n o t P (Y, X) )
66 ################################
67
68 p r o p e r p a r t =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PP (X,Y) == And ( P (X,Y) ,
Not ( P (Y,X) ) ) )
69
70 ################################
71 # INVERSE OF PROPER PART OF
72 # PPi (X,Y) : P (Y, X) / \ ( n o t P (X, Y) )
73 ################################
74
75 p r o p e r p a r t i =F o r A l l ( [ X,Y] , PPi (X,Y) == And ( P (Y,X) ,
Not ( P (X,Y) ) ) )
76
77 ################################
78 # AGENT
79 ################################
80
A Implementation of the ABF tool vii
81 s = S o l v e r ( )
82 s . s e t ( a u t o c o n f i g =F a l s e , mbqi=F a l s e )
83 s . add ( And ( r e f l e x i v i t y , symmetry , p a r t o f , p r o p e r p a r t ,
p r o p e r p a r t i , p a r t i a l o v e r l a p , d i s c r e t e f r o m ,
e q u a l t o , o v e r l a p s ) )
84
85
86 A = Const ( ’A’ , Boundary )
87 B = Const ( ’B’ , Boundary )
88 F = Const ( ’ F ’ , Boundary )
89
90 r c c 5 = { ’ eq ’ : EQ, ’ pp ’ : PP , ’ ppi ’ : PPi , ’ po ’ : PO , ’ dr ’ : DR}
91
92 c o u n t e r =1
93 c o u n t e r s a t =0
94 c o u n t e r u n s a t =0
95 coun te r unknown =0
96
97 f o r i i n r c c 5 :
98 r1= r c c 5 [ i ] ( A, B)
99 f o r j i n r c c 5 :
100 r2= r c c 5 [ j ] ( B , F )
101 f o r k i n r c c 5 :
102 r3= r c c 5 [ k ] ( A, F )
103
104 a g e n t=And ( r1 , r2 , r3 )
105
106 s . push ( )
107 s . add ( a g e n t )
108 check=s . check ( )
109 o f f s e t 1 = ’ ’*(5− l e n ( s t r ( c o u n t e r ) ) )
110 o f f s e t 2 = ’ ’*(12− l e n ( s t r ( check ) ) )
111 p r i n t (”%d %s %s %s %s ”%( c o u n t e r , o f f s e t 1 , check , o f f s e t 2 ,
a g e n t ) )
112
113 i f ( check == u n s a t ) :
114 c o u n t e r u n s a t +=1
115 # p r i n t ( ” a %s”%s . u n s a t c o r e ( ) )
116 i f ( check == unknown ) :
117 coun te r unknown+=1
118 i f ( check == s a t ) :
119 c o u n t e r s a t +=1
120
121 s . pop ( )
122 c o u n t e r +=1
123
124 p r i n t ( ” \ n ********\nSTATISTICS\n\ n a g e n t s=%d\ n s a t=%d\ n u n s a t=%d\nunknown=%d”%
( c o u n t e r −1 , c o u n t e r s a t , c o u n t e r u n s a t , coun te r unknown ) )
